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THE NEW ZEALAND COURT OF APPEAL AND 
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS 
RICHARD SCRAGG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of the doctrine of stare decisis rose to prominence in the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in 2003. In Jones v Sky City Auckland Ltd1 the 
Court made a pronouncement on the current position of the doctrine in that 
Court. In the marginally earlier case of Attorney-General v Ngati Apa,2 
the Court refused to follow its prior decision in In Re the Ninety Mile 
Beach3 and did so in this very important case without any discussion of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. In addition, in October, the Supreme Court Bill 
passed its Third Reading in Parliament and received the Royal assent. 
With the establishment of the Supreme Court in New Zealand and the 
abolition of the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
sitting in London, the Court of Appeal in this country will occupy a position 
very different from the one it has traditionally occupied. In consequence, 
the establishment of the new Court is likely to have a significant impact on 
the doctrine of stare decisis in the Court of Appeal. This article traces the 
history of the doctrine in the New Zealand Court of Appeal and proffers 
comments on future directions. 
II. THE IMPACT OF YOUNG V BRISTOL AEROPLANE CO LTD 
In 1944 the English Court of Appeal pronounced clearly that it was bound 
by its own prior decisions. This was in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co 
Ltd.4 In delivering the judgment of the Court, Lord Greene MR allowed for 
three exceptions to the rule that the Court is so bound by its own decisions. 
First, the Court may choose between two conflicting decisions of its own. 
Secondly, it must refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not 
expressly overruled, is inconsistent with a decision of the House of Lords. 
Thirdly, it is not bound to follow a decision of its own givenper incuriam. 
This was affirmed by the House of Lords as a correct statement of the law 
when Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd went before it.5 Young v Bristol 
Aeroplane Co Ltd made its impact felt in New Zealand in 1947 when the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal considered it in Re Rayner (Dec 'd), 
Daniell v Rayner.6 The issue of stare decisis arose in Re Rayner because 
the Court of Appeal had to decide whether it was bound by its own decision 
in Re Houghton7 or whether it could overrule it, given that it was 
inconsistent with the decision of the House of Lords in O 'Grady v Wilmot.8 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Canterbury. 
1 [2004] 1 NZLR 192. 
2 [2003] 3 NZLR 643. 
3 [1963] NZLR 461. 
4 [1944] KB 718. 
5 [1946] AC 163, 169. 
6 [1948] NZLR 455. 
7 [1945] NZLR 639. 
8 [1916] 2 AC 231. 
The matter was of such importance that both Divisions of the Court of Appeal 
sat, creating a Bench of seven judges. 
Prior to Re Rayner the Court of Appeal had on a number of occasions held 
it could overrule its own prior decisions. Finlay J, delivering the leading 
judgment in Re Rayner, referred to Hutchison v Ripeka te Peehi,9 R v 
Storey10 (where it did not become necessary to decide the question) andIn 
re Rhodes, Barton v Moorhouse.11 Finlay J stated: 
Having regard to the strength of the Court which pronounced the judgment in Young v 
Bristol Aeroplane CoLtd, the acuteness and comprehensiveness of its analysis of all the 
preceding decisions, and the conclusiveness of its conclusions, the law in Young v 
Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd is not likely to be departed from, and should be followed in 
this country. 12 
Finlay J found that the Court of Appeal had the authority to overrule Re 
Houghton on the ground of the exception in Young v Bristol Aeroplane 
Co Ltd that Re Houghton was inconsistent with a decision of the House 
of Lords13 or on the ground of the exception that Re Houghton was decided 
per incuriam.14 
The case was finally decided by a majority of five to two, Re Houghton 
was overruled and O'Grady v Wilmot adopted. Of the majority, Finlay J 
was the only judge to undertake a full examination of the stare decisis 
question. Fair J, one of the minority judges, also gave full consideration to 
the doctrine of stare decisis. Fair J reached his decision on the substantive 
issue on the basis that the practice of drafting wills differed in England and 
New Zealand and therefore O'Grady v Wilmot15 was inapplicable in New 
Zealand. Having so decided, his comments on whether the Court of Appeal 
had the power to overrule its own prior decisions became obiter dicta, as 
he expressly acknowledged. Fair J was of the view that the Court of Appeal 
should be able to correct a decision of its own which is 'obviously 
erroneous'16 but he was critical of Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd and 
critical of Finlay J's approach that inconsistency with the House of Lords, 
or the High Court of Australia, would justify overruling a prior decision. Of 
the seven judges, only Finlay J and Fair J discussed this issue fully. The 
other judges who delivered full judgments and referred to the issue in their 
judgments, were of the view that the Court of Appeal should be able to 
overrule a prior decision that was wrongly decided but were not anxious to 
specify the circumstances in which prior decisions could be so overruled. 
Re Rayner, then, does not mirror the approach of the English Court of 
Appeal in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd. 
The combined effect of the judgments in Re Rayner is that the Court of 
Appeal is ordinarily bound by its own prior decisions but can overrule a 
prior decision where appropriate. Only Finlay J is definitive about the 
circumstances in which a prior decision can be overruled. The other judges 
refrain from enumerating specific categories. 
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III. THE POSITION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL IN NEW ZEALAND Fair J 
makes a telling point in his judgment in Re Rayner. He states: 
The Court of Appeal in New Zealand occupies a position in the judicial hierarchy 
which differs very materially from that of the Court of Appeal in England ....... It 
consequently follows that the Court of Appeal is in effect, in nearly all cases, the final 
court in New Zealand.17 
As Wood recently put it, the New Zealand Court of Appeal leads a 
'schizophrenic existence as an intermediate appellate court in some areas, 
and as our final indigenous judicial body in other areas'.18 Both the English 
and New Zealand Courts of Appeal are intermediate appellate courts but 
the fact that New Zealand's ultimate court of appeal has traditionally sat 
thousands of miles away marks a major difference between them. It is not 
just a question of distance and associated expense.19 Privy Council decisions 
in New Zealand cases are usually very short. It is plain that, as a court, the 
Privy Council conducts itself in an error correction role, and refrains from 
exercising leadership in developing the common law of New Zealand.20 
The leadership role is left to the New Zealand Court of Appeal. Courts 
exercising this role today are not generally rigidly bound by their own prior 
decisions; the Privy Council has never been bound by its own prior 
decisions, the House of Lords has not been so bound since 1966 and the 
High Court of Australia is not so bound. From Re Rayner it is clear that 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal has always been aware of the 
difficulty of its being rigidly bound by its own prior decisions, given the 
unusual position it occupies for an intermediate appellate court. 
IV. POST RE RAYNER 
After Re Rayner the question of stare decisis arose again in Preston v 
Preston21 in 1955, in Re Mans on22 in 1964 and in McFarlane v Sharp23 in 
1972. In Preston v Preston North J stated: 
It may well be necessary on some future occasion for this Court authoritatively to 
determine whether the Court of Appeal in New Zealand, in considering whether it is 
bound by its own previous decisions, should regard itself as governed exclusively by 
the principles laid down in Young .... [or whether they should be extended].24 
In Re Manson, in an effort to persuade the Court not to follow one of its 
prior decisions, substantial argument was put before the Court concerning 
whether Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd had been adopted in Re 
Rayner. McCarthy J, in delivering the judgment of the Court, acknowledged 
that the Court of Appeal in Re Rayner did not fully decide whether it 
should follow the practice of the English Court of Appeal in Young v Bristol 
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Aeroplane Co Ltd 25 and nor did it do so in Preston v Preston.26 In Re 
Manson the Court of Appeal did not decide the point and did not overrule 
the prior decision under consideration. 
In McFarlane v Sharp, counsel tried to persuade the Court not to follow 
a decision that had stood for seventy years. The Court of Appeal refused 
to do so and referred to the speech of Lord Reid in Jones v Secretary of 
State27 in which he stated that he did not seek to categorise cases in which 
the power to depart from previous decisions should be used but ventured 
the opinion that the typical case for reconsidering an old decision is where 
some broad issue is involved and only in rare cases should there be a 
reconsideration of questions of construction of statutes or other documents.28 
V. THE 1980S AND 1990S 
By the time New Zealand entered the 1980s it was clear that the Court of 
Appeal was ordinarily bound by its own prior decisions but this 
notwithstanding, the Court could overrule a prior decision if the need to do 
so arose. The precise circumstances in which it could depart from precedent 
were not clearly defined. The position was not necessarily the same as 
that stated for England in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd. In 1986 
Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd29 came before the 
court. In this case Richardson J stated: 
Since this Court was reconstituted in 1957 with permanent appellate judges it has not 
found it necessary to adopt a fixed rule as to the circumstances in which it will reconsider 
an earlier decision of the Court. Nor had it done so in the preceding period. InRe Rayner 
[ 1948] NZLR 455, although the Court with two divisions specially assembled and after 
full argument was asked to say that the rule in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [ 1944] 
KB 718 should be adopted, there was no firm pronouncement on the point... .Seven 
years later in Preston v Preston [1955] NZLR 1251 the Court again left the matter 
open and in doing so presaged the possibility of a less rigid approach than had been 
expressed in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd. See too Re Manson [1964] NZLR 
257.30 
Richardson J went on to list a number of cases where the Court of Appeal, 
without any discussion of stare decisis, proceeded on the basis that it was 
entitled to review its earlier decisions. He then stated the position in terms 
that have been regarded as authoritative ever since: 
This Court will ordinarily follow its earlier decisions but will be prepared to review and 
affirm, modify or overrule an earlier decision where it is satisfied it should do so, but 
without attempting to categorise the classes of cases in which it will interfere.31 
This statement encapsulates the practice of the Court from its inception. 
The language used is telling. Richardson J does not speak of the Court 
being 'bound', he says it will 'ordinarily follow' its earlier decisions. He 
then recognises that the Court does not wish to specify categories when it 
will do so. Elsewhere in the judgment he refers to 'a cautious willingness to 
review earlier decisions in what are perceived to be appropriate cases...'32 
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In his judgment in the same case, Somers J states: 
The boundaries of the doctrine of precedent in this Court are far from clear. It may be 
expected that the Court would be willing to review an earlier decision in the exceptional 
cases instanced in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718.I think it likely to 
be the case too... .that there are other and wider circumstances in which in New Zealand 
such a review may be undertaken... .In this context it may be material that this Court is 
in almost all cases the Court of last resort for litigants.33 
In his last sentence Somers J echoes Fair J in Re Rayner.34 
McMullin J states that the Court of Appeal has 'in practice been reviewing 
earlier decisions on a case to case basis'.35 
In Aratiki Properties Ltd v Craig 36 Cooke P and McMullin J further 
explored the law as stated in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing 
Ltd. Cooke P stated : 
It remains to say something about the reliance by counsel for the Official Liquidator on 
Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd, especially as counsel indicated 
that on his understanding of the judgments in that case it was unnecessary for him to 
present any argument on stare decisis and that he had accordingly not prepared one.... 
Lest the understanding of Lawrence s case just mentioned is shared by others, it seems 
as well to say explicitly that, as pointed out in the judgments in that case, the question 
of the circumstances in which this Court should treat itself as free to depart from 
previous decisions of its own was not argued there. Indeed the judgment of Woodhouse 
P quoted an apparently unqualified admission by counsel for the Collector of Customs 
that previous decisions of the Court of Appeal were not binding on the Court of 
Appeal. While opinions and suggestions were expressed in varying degrees in the 
judgments delivered, it cannot be said that the case constitutes any definitive ruling on 
matters that were not argued. The case should not be construed as opening the door to 
attempts to unsettle existing precedents simply on the ground that they are alleged to 
be inconvenient or wrong. There are obviously occasions when, for instance, changed 
circumstances in New Zealand or new trends in overseas authorities will justify this 
court in undertaking a review of one of its own previous decisions. But no attempt to 
define such occasions would be appropriate in the present case, when we have heard no 
more argument on the subject than was heard in Lawrence itself.37 
McMullin J stated: 
I wish only to make a few observations about the judgment delivered by members of this 
Courtin Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 404. In 
that case, in the absence of argument as to whether, and in what circumstances, this 
Court might review its own earlier decisions, I felt free for three reasons singular to the 
case and for a fourth and pragmatic one, to review an earlier decision of this Court in 
Police v News Media Ownership Ltd [ 1975] 1 NZLR 610. But in the face of what was said 
in the judgments of the minority in that case and what I said in my own judgment, it 
would be wrong to assume that this Court will be willing to depart from precedent 
which it has already laid down without argument justify ing such a course. Only when 
proper argument to that end has been heard will the Court be able to attempt a review of 
an earlier decision.38 
In Shing v Ashcroft39 Cooke P again acknowledged the power of the 
Court of Appeal to overrule one of its own decisions but commented: 
Obviously the issue of precedent and, if found appropriate, the question whether this 
particular prior decision should be overruled ought not to be dealt with except by a 
Court of five.40 
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The need for a full Bench in order to overrule a prior decision has been a 
recurrent theme in the authorities in this country. 
In Dahya v Dahya 41 a full Court considered the circumstances in which it 
would depart from one of its prior decisions. As stated by Cooke P,42 this 
was the first time since Re Manson 43 that the Court had heard substantial 
argument on the matter. 
Cooke P made three general observations.44 First, the question must be one 
of practice, in which the experience of the Court and its view of the values 
sought in the administration of justice in New Zealand have some part to 
play. Secondly, it is important, especially for a small country such as New 
Zealand, that the national appellate court should hold itself free to take account 
of and benefit from decisions elsewhere in the English-speaking world. Thirdly, 
a Bench of five should be somewhat less reluctant to depart from a prior 
decision of the court than a Bench of three, especially if the prior decision 
was of a majority of two to one. The New Zealand courts should not abrogate 
the responsibility of trying to adjudicate on New Zealand justiciable problems. 
Richardson J quoted what he had said in Collector of Customs v Lawrence 
Publishing Ltd.45 He went on to state that there are four reasons for 
departing from previous authority. The first is that any judicial change reflects 
an assessment that the obtaining of a socially just result outweighs the 
considerations of certainty and predictability in a particular case. The 
second is that the realities of parliamentary time preclude reliance on the 
development of legislation concerning all areas of law, or on the periodical 
reviewing of the whole body of case law on statutory provisions. The 
third is that the right of appeal with leave to the Privy Council is for 
practical purposes exercisable in only a minute fraction of New Zealand 
decisions. In addition, there is a natural hesitation on the part of the Privy 
Council to differ from the New Zealand Court of Appeal on matters of 
local practice, or on social issues. 
The fourth and associated reason is that, in as much as our laws are designed 
to meet conditions and values in our society, the Court of Appeal must accept 
responsibility for the administration of the laws of New Zealand. Hardie 
Boys J agreed with Cooke P that the Court of Appeal must be free to 
depart from its own previous decision in an appropriate case. A good 
reason to depart from the previous decision must be shown, for example, 
that there is another conflicting decision of the Court; that the law has 
clearly developed differently in other highly persuasive jurisdictions; that 
social attitudes or practices in this country have changed; or that even 
without such factors the conviction that the earlier decision was wrong is 
shared by a substantial majority of the current membership of the Court. 
In Cross v CIR 46 Cooke P commented on Dahya v Dahya: 
The question of departure by this Court from previous decisions of its own has recently 
been considered in Dahya v Dahya [ 1991 ] 2 NZLR 150. Something more is required to 
justify derogating from the important principle of stare decisis than a different opinion 
on a finely balanced point of statutory construction.47 
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In all of these cases we find the New Zealand Court of Appeal expressing 
itself as ordinarily bound by its own prior decisions but the real focus is not 
on being bound, but on when the Court may depart from such decisions. 
The Court is plainly reluctant to define precisely when it may do so. The 
question was amplified further in R v Hines.48 In the joint judgment of 
Richardson P and Keith J, their Honours quote Richardson J's formulation 
in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Ltd49 and they then 
make further comments. They state50 that there are three considerations 
in determining whether it is appropriate for the courts 'to fashion a new 
rule'. First, the appropriateness of judicial review in any case will be 
influenced by the subject matter and its closeness to the Court's function. 
Second, in making value judgments the Court is seeking to apply underlying 
community values, not the judge's personal values. Third, whether the 
particular question is appropriate for judicial resolution: 
The larger the public policy context, the less well equipped the Courts are to weigh the 
considerations involved and to attempt to resolve any moral quandaries and the less 
inclined they must be to intervene. That is particularly so where there are public policy 
ramifications affecting the bases of other relevant common law or statutory provisions. 
In short, where the consequences reach beyond the limits of the case and beyond a 
particular response to a particular issue. 51 
Blanchard J stated: 
On the question of the review of its previous decisions this Court should adopt the 
position taken by Richardson J in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd 
[1986] 1 NZLR 404 at pp414-415.52 
His Honour continued: 
The appropriate policy on precedent for a (de facto) final appellate Court should mix 
caution and flexibility. This Court must not gain a reputation for easily being persuaded 
to depart from its earlier decisions. It has not done so over the past decade. That 
position must not change. On the other hand, when sitting as a Full Court it must have 
the freedom of action to be able to restate the law of New Zealand as changes in social 
conditions and legal developments in this country and elsewhere require. It ought not to 
fetter itself with rules about when earlier decisions may be departed from, as the 
English Court of Appeal, a truly intermediate Court, did in Young v Bristol Aeroplane 
Co Ltd [1944] KB 718.53 
In Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin54 the Court of Appeal overruled 
an earlier decision. Again, reference was made to Richardson J's words in 
Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd 55. This was an 
employment law case concerning redundancy. Thomas J dealt with the 
precedent question very shortly in his judgment: 
I do not consider that the Court's decision to reconsider Brighouse56 requires the 
extensive justification it receives in the main judgment. For myself, it is enough that no 
single ratio is discernible in the judgments of the majority and that the decision has 
proved controversial. To decline to review the decision would be to deny the law its 
social utility and capacity to develop.57 
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VI. JONES V SKY CITY AUCKLAND LTD 
The Court of Appeal entered the new millennium with a firm emphasis on 
the Court's power to depart from its own prior decisions.58 Re Rayner had 
virtually ceased to be referred to in judgments concerned with the doctrine 
of stare decisis. Instead, the pronouncement of Richardson J in Collector 
of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd 59 had come to represent the 
standard formulation on the subject. 
The matter has now come before the Court of Appeal again, in Jones v 
Sky City Auckland Ltd.60 In this case Keith J delivers the judgment of a 
full Court of five. The case concerns s67 of the Casino Control Act 1990. 
Under s67 a casino can make an order barring a person from entering the 
casino. Jones had an order made against him under s67 and challenged it in 
Court. Jones claimed that the power of exclusion under s67 is limited, 
particularly by reference to considerations of reasonableness, with an 
obligation on the licensee to give reasons for its action. The problem 
confronting Jones was that in Sky City Auckland Ltd v Wu,61 determined only 
in 2002, the Court of Appeal had held that holders of casino licences are 
entitled to exclude members of the public from the casino without 
assigning a reason so long as they do not act in breach of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 or any other relevant legislation. In order to succeed, 
Jones had to overcome the decision in Wu's case. This led the Court to 
the doctrine of stare decisis as the Court had to address the question of when 
it could depart from, and overrule, its own prior decisions. In the event, the 
Court of Appeal could not find any ground for departing from its decision 
in Wu's case62 and Jones's appeal was dismissed. The interest of the 
judgment lies in what the Court of Appeal said about stare decisis. Keith 
J quotes Richardson J in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing 
Co Ltd63 but also offers his own formulation of the law governing this issue. 
He says: 
While this Court can of course reconsider and overrule its own earlier decisions and it 
has not stated precise rules to regulate that action, our approach is cautious.64 
This wording is very interesting. There is no express mention of the Court 
being bound. Rather it is a formulation concerned with not being bound. This 
goes beyond Richardson J's formulation. Matters do not rest there, though. 
The real interest in stare decisis in the Court of Appeal today arises not from 
Jones v Sky City Auckland Ltd but from a case that preceded it in time by 
a narrow margin and which is notable because it was decided without a 
discussion of the doctrine. This case is Attorney-General v Ngati Apa.65 
58 In Attorney-General of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v Reynolds [1980] AC 637 the 
Privy Council in an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the West Indies Associated States Supreme 
Court pronounced that the rule in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd applied generally to all 
intermediate appellate courts. In this respect the decision appears to be per incuriam as it overlooks 
contrary existing authority on the point. For a discussion, see G Orchard, 'Stare Decisis in the 
Court of Appeal' [1980] New Zealand Law Journal 380. 
59 Above n 31. 
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VII. ATTORNEY-GENERAL VNGATIAPA 
Attorney-General v Ngati Apa is popularly known as 'the foreshore case'. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal was confronted with In Re the Ninety-
Mile Beach. 66 In this prior decision the Court of Appeal had held that the 
Maori Land Court lacked jurisdiction to investigate and issue freehold titles 
on a claim to customary title to the foreshore. In the Ngati Apa case, the 
Court of Appeal reached the opposite result, holding that the Maori Land 
Court does have jurisdiction to determine the status - whether customary 
land or otherwise - of foreshore and seabed. 
Given the decision in In Re the Ninety-Mile Beach, the question arises as 
to how the Court of Appeal was able to decide in this way. The Ngati 
Apa case holds that In Re the Ninety-Mile Beach is founded on a 
misunderstanding of the position of Maori customary title as law in this 
country. In consequence, In Re the Ninety-Mile Beach was wrongly 
decided. As Elias CJ put it: 
In Re the Ninety-Mile Beach followed the discredited authority of Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72, which was rejected by the Privy Council in 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker [1901] AC 561. This not a modern revision, based on 
developing insights since 1963. The reasoning the Court applied in In Re the Ninety-
Mile Beach was contrary to other and higher authority and indeed was described at the 
time as "revolutionary". 67 
In paragraph 87 the Chief Justice lists the authorities, including 
Commonwealth authorities, to which the reasoning in In Re the Ninety-
Mile Beach is contrary and refers to a number of modern writers who 
have doubted the reasoning. She is particularly influenced by Sir Kenneth 
Roberts-Wray in his 1966 book, 'Commonwealth and Colonial Law'. 
Tipping J states: 
The decision in Ninety Mile Beach has stood for forty years. Furthermore, it must have 
been regarded as correctly stating the law by those responsible for subsequent legislation. 
Hence a cautious approach should be taken to the suggestion that the case was wrongly 
decided. That said, I am driven to the conclusion that it was.68 
Elias CJ, Tipping J and Keith and Anderson JJ in a joint judgment, examine 
the authorities in detail in reaching their conclusion. None of the judges, 
however, discusses the significance of the doctrine of stare decisis for the 
Court in reaching its decision. It is a case of the kind referred to by 
Richardson J in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd,69 
where the Court simply accepts that it is entitled to overrule a prior decision. 
The decision in the Ngati Apa case has given rise to major public 
controversy. There is no doubt that the Court has the power to overrule 
one of its own prior decisions. If In Re the Ninety-Mile Beach is wrongly 
decided, this is a clear ground for overruling it. Decisions reached per 
incuriam are one of the categories of exception recognised in Young v 
Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd 70 and are expressly referred to in Re Rayner.71 
Whether the case was wrongly decided, or whether the Ngati Apa decision 
is in fact a 'modern revision, based on developing insights since 1963', to 
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use the Chief Justice's words,72 is another matter. As Elias CJ states in 
paragraph 25, 'Although the reasoning in Wi Parata was rejected by the 
Privy Council, it continued to influence thinking in New Zealand'. In any 
event, the Ngati Apa case appears to be an example of a case of the kind 
referred to by Richardson P and Keith J in R v Hines73 which involves an 
issue that raises the question of whether it is one appropriate for judicial 
resolution. This would seem to be a case where change would have been 
more appropriately dealt with by the legislature. It is noteworthy that the 
decision in the Ngati Apa case appears likely to lead to legislation on the 
issue it decides, resulting from government concern for the ramifications 
of the decision throughout society. 
VIII. HOUSE OF LORDS AND NEW ZEALAND COURT OF APPEAL COMPARED 
Since 1966 the House of Lords has not been rigidly bound by its own prior 
decisions. As it stated in its Practice Statement of that year: 
Their Lordships ....  recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice 
in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They 
propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions 
of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears 
right to do so.74 
The House of Lords, an ultimate court of appeal, is not strictly bound by its 
own decisions but regards them as 'normally binding' and rarely departs 
from them. The New Zealand Court of Appeal, by comparison, will 'ordinarily 
follow'75 its own prior decisions but will overrule a prior decision where 
appropriate. There is no practical difference between the two Courts in 
the way in which they address the matter of departing from their own prior 
decisions, although the Court of Appeal is only an intermediate appellate 
court, occupying in the New Zealand hierarchy of courts a position equivalent 
to that of the Court of Appeal in England, a Court that is bound by its own 
prior decisions within the terms of Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd. 
This is significant and reflects the fact that, although the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal is not an ultimate court of appeal, the circumstances of the 
appellate system in this country are such that it approximates one. These 
circumstances are about to change. 
IX. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND 
On the 17th of October, 2003, the Supreme Court Bill received the Royal 
assent. The Act has a commencement date of the 1st of January 2004 and 
will come into full effect later in that year. The Supreme Court Act 2003 
abolishes the right of appeal in New Zealand to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council and creates a Supreme Court to sit as the ultimate court 
of appeal in this country. The creation of this new Court raises important 
questions about the doctrine of stare decisis. In this respect the Court's 
first concern will be with whether it is to be bound by its own prior decisions. 
As an ultimate court of appeal, it is unlikely that it will be so bound. The 
Privy Council has never been bound by its own prior decisions and the 
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House of Lords has not been so bound for virtually half a century. Beyond 
this, the Supreme Court will have to determine where it stands, relative to 
stare decisis, with regard to decisions of the Privy Council in New Zealand 
cases. 
The process of replacing the Privy Council with a Supreme Court began 
with the Attorney-General establishing an Advisory Group to look in to the 
matter. The Report of the Advisory Group to the Attorney-General states, 
'Privy Council decisions, made while the Privy Council was New Zealand's 
final appellate court, should normally be followed' but then states, 'However, 
the Supreme Court should be free to depart from existing authority when it 
appears right to do so.'76 
Presumably the Report is trying to say that the Supreme Court will be 
engaged in determining the law as it exists in this country. Decisions of the 
Privy Council may or may not be of use in this regard. The way that this 
matter has been dealt with in Australia may prove helpful here. The Privy 
Council was originally the ultimate court of appeal for Australia. This 
has not been the case now since 1986.77 From the recent case of Barns v 
Barns,78 it is plain that the High Court of Australia regards Privy Council 
decisions to be of persuasive authority only. As Barwick CJ put it in Viro 
v The Queen: 
The essential basis for the observance of a tribunal by way of binding precedent is that 
the tribunal can correct the decisions of the Court which is said to be bound. This 
condition can no longer be satisfied in the case of this Court in relation to the Privy 
Council.79 
It would seem likely that this sort of reasoning would hold sway with New 
Zealand's Supreme Court. 
Beyond these questions, there is the matter of the Court of Appeal. Once 
the Supreme Court has been established, the Court of Appeal will no longer 
occupy the position referred to by Fair J in Re Rayner.80 Its position in 
New Zealand will no longer be, 'in effect, in nearly all cases, the final court 
in New Zealand'. This must have a significant impact on the doctrine of 
stare decisis in that Court. In England, when Lord Denning MR tried to 
free the Court of Appeal of the doctrine, the House of Lords firmly stated 
in Davis v Johnson81 that the Court of Appeal was bound by its own prior 
decisions, subject to the exceptions in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd. 
With the advent of the Supreme Court there is no justification for the position 
as first stated by Richardson J in Collector of Customs v Lawrence 
Publishing Co Ltd,82 nor for that expressed by Keith J in Jones v Sky 
City Auckland Ltd.83 These definitions are too imprecise for an intermediate 
appellate court, acting as an intermediate appellate court in the true sense. 
No doubt the Supreme Court will want to see the Court of Appeal bound 
by its own prior decisions, albeit while recognising the need for some 
exceptions. The categories of exception the Court of Appeal has been 
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reluctant to define will need to be spelt out. It will be interesting to see if 
the categories are confined to those in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co 
Ltd84 or whether they will be broader. In any event, the emphasis will no 
doubt be on the Court of Appeal's being bound by its own prior decisions, 
not, as at present, on when it may depart from them. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The position of the Court of Appeal in this country has always been a 
difficult one with regard to the doctrine of stare decisis. Although it is an 
intermediate appellate court, the fact that New Zealand's ultimate court of 
appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sits twelve thousand 
miles away, has placed it in a position distinct from its equivalent in England. 
As Fair J put it, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, 'is in effect, in nearly all 
cases, the final Court in New Zealand.'85 The establishment of the Supreme 
Court as the ultimate court of appeal for New Zealand changes the status 
of the Court of Appeal in this country. This change should lead to a precise 
definition of the effect of the doctrine of stare decisis on the Court of 
Appeal, such as never has been the case before. The focus of the 
significance of the doctrine in this country will shift from the Court of 
Appeal to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the creation of the Supreme 
Court marks the beginning of a new era for the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal. 
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